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to be false, 36 the court in Larchmont did not have to inquire as
deeply because it found the statements in the article and letters to
be constitutionally protected opinion and not statements of
37
objective fact.
When the assertion of an alleged opinion is being analyzed by
the courts in order to determine whether it is protected speech, it
is given greater deference by the New York State test than it is
afforded under the federal test for defamation. 3 8 The State of
New York chose this test specifically for the purpose of giving its
citizens extra protection beyond that afforded under the federal
test. 39 The New York State courts accomplish this goal by
evaluating the expression in the full context in which it was
made, whereas the federal courts tend to isolate the statements
40
more when deciding defamation cases.
SUPREME COURT
BRONX COUNTY

Cruz v. Latin News Impacto Newspaper 41
(printed June 7, 1994)
The plaintiff claimed that a newspaper article written about her
was libelous. 42 The defendants moved for summary judgment

36. Id. at 246, 567 N.E.2d at 1276, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
37. Larchmont, 206 A.D.2d at 508, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 74.

38. See generally 600 West 115th Street Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d
130, 145, 603 N.E.2d 930, 938, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825, 833 (1992).
39. See Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 249, 567 N.B.2d
1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d 913, cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).

40. The New York State Court of Appeals disagrees with the dissection of
expressions at issue in defamation cases because that process "may result in

identifying many more implied factual assertions than would a reasonable
person encountering that expression in context." Id. at 255, 567 N.t.2d at
1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
41. N.Y. L.J., June 7, 1994, at 23 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1994).
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asserting, amongst other things, the constitutional protection of
freedom of expression. 43 The court rejected the defendants'
motion partly on the grounds that the case did not involve a free
speech issue. 44
The plaintiff commenced the action against the defendants as a
result of a newspaper article and accompanying photographs
printed in the defendants' newspaper. 4 5 The report portrayed the
plaintiff as a fifty-seven year old grandmother who was dying of
AIDS. 4 6 The plaintiff believed the article was libelous in that
according to the then existing Center For Disease Control
[hereinafter CDC] standards, she did not, in fact, have AIDS. 47
Rather plaintiff, was infected with the HIV virus.48
In response, the defendants contended that the more recent
Center For Disease Control standards governed and that under
49
such guidelines the plaintiff did, in fact, have AIDS. The
defendant further argued that if the latter Center For Disease
Control standard reigned, then the plaintiff could not meet her
burden of proof and the complaint should therefore be summarily
dismissed.50
The court denied the defendants' motion for summary relief. It
held that triable issues of fact "existed as to the truth or falsity"
42. Id. In addition to the libel action, plaintiff sought to recover damages
for "trespass, violation of privacy, unjust enrichment, violation of the New
York Civil Rights Law and infliction of emotional distress." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id.
46. Id. The article published by defendant stated that "plaintiff's AIDS
[had been] contracted from a philandering husband; that plaintiff suffers from
tuberculosis as well; and that plaintiff ha[s] a retarded grandchild." Id.
47. Id. In 1992 the "CDC defined AIDS as the presence of HIV infection
coupled with the presence of certain AIDS-defining opportunistic infections."

Id.
48. Id. In addition, plaintiff denied each of the above cited allegations. Id.
49. Id. According to the 1993 CDC report "a person is deemed to have
AIDS if HIV infected white T-cell count is below 200." Id.
50. Id. Defendants claim that plaintiff must demonstrate "substantial
falsity" in order to overcome a summary judgment motion. Id. Based on the
1993 CDC report plaintiff cannot meet this burden. Id.
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of the factual assertions in the article. 5 1 Beginning its analysis,
the. Cruz court established that a defamatory action could exist
based on the present set of facts. 52 The court stated that "false
allegations about whether one is suffering from AIDS can be held
to be defamatory." 53 The court reasoned that public perception is
quite different between a person who is HIV infected that may
lead a fairly normal life and a person who has AIDS that is facing
imminent death. 54
The court further ruled that the "false statenients ... are not
constitutionally protected.,,5 5 Moreover, New York constitutional
protection of freedom of expression 56 would not protect the
defendant because "'there [wa]s no strong public interest in
knowing the identity of someone who is HIV positive or suffering
from AIDS [and that t]here is no free speech issue which the
57
State must recognize in revealing the identity of such person..'"
The Cruz court discussed the effectiveness of a free speech.
defense in a defamation action. 5 8 In Greenberg v. CBS, Inc.,59
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. See Katapodis v. Brooklyn Spectator, Inc., 287 N.Y. 17, 38
N.E.2d 112 (1941) (broadening the definition of a defamatory communication
to include statements that would be likely to arouse pity or sympathy);
Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 186 N.B. 217
(1933) (defining a defamatory communication as one that tends to hold a
person up to hatted, contempt or ridicule, or to cause them to be shunned or
avoided).
54. Id. See New York State Society of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 77 N.Y.2d
677, 572 N.E.2d 605, 569 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1991) (stating that HIV is a virus
that is distinct from the disease of AIDS).
55. Cruz, N.Y. L.J., June 7, 1994, at 23.
56. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 7. Section 7 provides in part: "Every citizen
may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
57. Cnz. N.Y. L.J., June 7, 1994, at 23 (quoting Anderson v. Strong
Memorial Hosp., 151 Misc. 2d 353, 356, 573 N.Y.S.2d 828, 831 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1991)).
58. See Greenberg v. CBS, Inc., 69 A.D.2d 693, 699, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988,
991 (2d. Dep't 1979) (weighing the competing values and interests present in
defamation suits against the media in order to insure that there be no deterrent.
to the vigorous and frilitful exercise of First Amendment freedoms); Le
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the court held that "[h]it and run journalism is no more protected
under the First Amendment, than speeding on a crowded
' 60 On the
sidewalk is permitted under a valid driver's license.
issue of summary judgment the Greenbergcourt commented that:
[W]e also realize that motions for summary judgment in
defamation actions are invaluable devices to insure the free and
uninhibited debate of matters of public concern by obviating the
necessity for protracted and expensive litigation where there are
no factual issues. However, solicitude for first amendment
freedoms was not intended to abrogate the fundamental rules
governing the administration of summary judgment. If a
material, triable issue of fact exists in a libel action, summary
judgment must be denied. 6 1

Furthermore, in Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Systems, 62 the court proclaimed that "crimes and torts committed
in news gathering are not protected." 63 The Le Mistral court
commented that "[t]here is no threat to a free press in requiring
its agents to act within the law.' 64
The Cruz court's analysis was consistent with the federal
standard that is applied to defamation cases. 65 The court found
that since the plaintiff was a private individual 66 and the article
was a matter of private concern, 67 it was not necessary that the
Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 61 A.D.2d 491, 493, 402
N.Y.S.2d 815, 816-17 (1st Dep't 1978) (considering whether, despite the tort
committed, the "defendant is insulated from any damage award by virtue of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution").
59. 69 A.D.2d 693, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988 (2d Dep't 1979).
60. Id. at 700, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 991 (citations omitted).
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. 61 A.D.2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1st Dep't 1978).
63. Id. at 494, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817. "The court recognizefd] that the
exercise of the right of... free press... mandates the observance of the
coequal duty not to abuse such right." Id.
64. Id. ("The First Amendment is not a shibboleth before which all other
rights must succumb.").
65. Cruz, N.Y. L.J ., June 7, 1994, at 23.
66. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
67. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/38

4

et al.: Freedom of Speech & Press

944

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 11

plaintiff prove actual malice on the part of the defendant. 68 In
deciding the defamation issue, the Cruz court cited Galella v.
Onassis.69 In Galella, the court held that the First Amendment
does not establish a wall of immunity which protects news
persons from any liability for their conduct while gathering
news. 70
Since under both New York and federal analysis the Cruz court
did not find that freedom of speech would act as an absolute
defense and since triable issues of fact existed, the defendants
motion for summary judgment was denied.
WESTCHESTER COUNTY

Glendora v. Kofalt 71
(decided July 28, 1994)
Plaintiff alleged that her state constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech 72 and freedom of expression 73 had been
violated when the defendant, Cable Systems Corporation, refused
to broadcast the plaintiffs program material. 74 The Supreme
Court, Westchester County, dismissed plaintiffs claims and held
that the defendant was not a state actor and the constitutional
guarantees complained about would merely "'protect the
individual against action by governmental authorities, not by

68. Cruz, N.Y. L.J., June 7, 1994, at 23.

69. 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that social needs may
warrant some intrusion of privacy, but the interference may be no greater than
that necessary).
70. Id. (stating that crimes and torts committed in news gathering are not
protected by the First Amendment).
71. 162 Misc. 2d 166, 616 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Suip. Ct. Westchester County
1994).
72. Id.at 168, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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